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Abstract 
Using state level personal income, we empirically demonstrate the importance of economic development and 
diversification for the changes in volatility. We show that volatility of income growth is initially decreasing in the level 
of income and the degree of diversification. Yet, as state income continues rising, its volatility starts increasing. We 
also find that expansion of interstate banking and the size of the service sector are among the factors that have 
influenced volatility.
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     1. Introduction
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in analyzing the reduction in the volatility
of real macro variables, not only at the aggregate level, but also at more disaggregated
levels. A number of studies document the heterogeneity in the degree and timing of the
Great Moderation in the U.S. states.1 A non-exhaustive list includes Carlino and DeFina
(1998), Carlino et al. (2007), Owyang et al. (2008), and Grennes et al. (2009). A common
theme in the various state level studies is the ¯nding that not all states have bene¯tted
equally from the moderation the aggregate economy has gone through. While some states
experienced extensive reduction in volatility, others have experienced increases in volatility.
The literature has explained the heterogeneity based on factors such as the role of banking
integration (Morgan et al. (2004)), di®erences in the manufacturing sector and state banking
deregulation (Carlino et al. (2007)), and monetary policy (Owyang et al. (2008)). The
purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how changes in volatility are related to
the level of economic development and diversi¯cation at the state level.
State level analysis is appealing as it allows one to study changes in the volatility of
income growth while holding constant monetary and exchange rate policy, as well as a range
of cultural and institutional variables, and any aggregate shocks. Even if one controls for such
variables, there remains substantial variation across states in important economic aspects
such as specialization in production, the structure of production and employment, ¯nancial
regulation (Morgan et al. (2004)), and the age distribution of the population (Jaimovich
and Siu (2009)). All those variables can di®erentially impact individual states and hence
contribute to asymmetries in the moderation of their volatilities.
The relationship between risk, volatility and economic development has been the focus
of many theoretical studies. The prominent examples include Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990), Saint-Paul (1992), Obstfeld (1994), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Adopting
a portfolio approach, all of these studies highlight the trade-o® between investing in high
risk sectors with high return and investing in relatively safe but low return sectors. In the
absence of full insurance of risks, producing in only a few sectors, either due to scarcity of
resources or due to comparative advantage considerations, implies higher variability of out-
put. Therefore, diversi¯cation of production provides insurance, yielding to lower volatility
of total output. As economies and/or ¯nancial markets develop, they start specializing again
since gains from specializing in high return projects o®set the welfare losses due of higher
volatility. Saint-Paul (1992) shows how countries diversify for insurance purposes, and later
they start to specialize as ¯nancial markets deepen. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and
Obstfeld (1994) focus on the role of ¯nancial intermediaries and international asset trading,
respectively, in providing insurance to the investors, and allowing them to invest in high-
yield projects without the volatility consequences. Similarly, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
show that at early stages of development, countries specialize in safe but less productive
1The Great Moderation phenomenon has been veri¯ed by formal statistical tests that show the existence
of a structural break around 1984 in the volatility of U.S. aggregate time series (Stock and Watson (2003)).
When data become available, it would be informative to analyze how the e®ects of the global recession of
2008-9 were distributed among the states.
1projects/sectors due to indivisibility and minimum size requirement for each project. Diver-
si¯cation opportunities arise as countries accumulate more capital, allowing them to produce
in more productive, albeit more risky, sectors in addition to the safer ones. The higher the
number of sectors that are open, the easier it becomes to diversify idiosyncratic risk.
The negative relationship between output volatility and growth has been documented in
numerous country-level studies (see e.g. Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Kose et al. (2006)).
More recently, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) analyze the relationship between volatility and
the level of economic development in a large panel of countries, and decompose aggregate
volatility into its components. They ¯nd that the poor countries tend to specialize in fewer
and more volatile sectors, and they experience more frequent and severe aggregate shocks.
Furthermore, consistent with the ¯ndings in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), they show that
sectoral concentration ¯rst decreases and then later increases with economic development.
We study the relationship between volatility and the level of development by estimat-
ing the impact of the level of income and the degree of specialization on income growth
volatility for the US states. We view personal income as an interesting variable to study
because of its implications for growth convergence (Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992)), risk
sharing ( Asdrubali et al. (1996); Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001); Del Negro (2002);
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003)) and consumption and welfare through the Permanent Income
Hypothesis (Friedman (1957); Hall (1978); Luengo-Prado and Sorensen (2008)). We inves-
tigate whether the heterogeneity in the volatility behavior of income growth across states
re°ects the di®erent stages of development process the states have gone through. As pre-
dicted by the aforementioned theories, the less developed states might have experienced
greater reductions in their volatilities as a consequence of their development processes. On
the other hand, the richer states might have experienced increases in their volatilities as
they started to invest in high risk-high return sectors along their respective development
processes. Therefore, the relationship between volatility and the level of development might
be not be monotonic, and it might depend on the degree of diversi¯cation at the state level.
Our results show that there is a signi¯cant non-monotonic relationship between the level
of income and income growth volatility. Volatility ¯rst decreases and at later stages increases
with the level of income. Moreover, volatility signi¯cantly decreases with the level of diversi-
¯cation. These ¯ndings imply that as the poor states have diversi¯ed their production bases
and as their income levels increased, their income growth volatility moderated. Yet, as the
rich states started specializing in high risk-high return sectors, their income growth volatility
increased. This pattern is consistent with the results of the structural break tests found in
Grennes et al. (2009). Our results are robust to the inclusion of some of the state-level
determinants of moderation that have been studied in the literature. Additionally, we ¯nd
that the degree of interstate banking and the size of services and durable manufacturing
sectors are signi¯cant determinants of income growth volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical speci¯cation
and describes the data. We present the results in section 3. Some concluding remarks are
provided in the last section.
22. Empirical Speci¯cation and Data
In order to investigate how the changes in volatility at the state level are associated with eco-
nomic development and the degree of diversi¯cation/specialization, we estimate the following
relationship:
¾it = Ài + ´t + ¯1yit + ¯2y
2
it + ¯3hit + °Xit + "it; (1)
where ¾it is the measure of real per capita income volatility in state i and year t, yit is the
logarithm of real per capita income, hit is the measure of specialization, and Xit is a vector
of other potential controls.2 We allow for the potential non-monotonicity of the volatility-
development relationship by including the quadratic income term, y2
it. This term allows us
to test whether volatility ¯rst decreases with the level of development, and then increases
slightly as the states invest in high risk-high return sectors. We include ¯xed e®ects, Ài,
in our speci¯cation in order to control for time-invariant, state speci¯c characteristics (such
as the distance to the capitol or to the oceans), and time e®ects, ´t; in order to control
for macro or policy shocks that are common to all states. Notice that, when we control
for time and ¯xed e®ects, the remaining variation in income volatility is attributable only
to time-varying state level factors. Therefore, we cannot directly assess the importance of
some of the common theories o®ered to explain the Great Moderation, such as more e®ective
national monetary policy.
We use data for personal income, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the
period 1960 ¡ 2001. We obtain real per capita personal income by de°ating the personal
income series by the consumer price index (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) due to the
unavailability of state level price indexes with the scope needed for our study.3 Finally,
to compute per capita ¯gures, we divide real personal income by annual state population
reported by the US Census Bureau.
We construct two income volatility measures: the ¯rst measure is the absolute value of
the deviations of the growth rate of real per capita personal income away from the average
growth rate for each state. This is the same measure used in Stock and Watson (2003). For
the second measure, we estimate an AR(1) process for the growth rate of real per capita
personal income in each state, and take the absolute value of the residuals of those processes.
The correlation between these two volatility measures is 0.91.
The state level sectoral employment data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2We investigated the time series properties of the logarithm of real per capita income using the panel
unit root tests developed by Levin and Lin (1993) and Im et al. (2003). When measured in the form of
deviations from common year-speci¯c means, the stationarity of real per capita income cannot be rejected
with the respective p-values for the test statistics 0.000 and 0.007. Notice that inclusion of time e®ects
in equation 1 eliminates the common trending components from y, and it is equivalent to subtracting the
common year-speci¯c means.
3This is a common practice in the literature, and a non-exhaustive list of this approach includes Asdrubali
et al. (1996), Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) and Luengo-Prado and Sorensen (2008)). Two exceptions
to this practice are Del Negro (2002), and Hess and Shin (1998), who are able to build state level CPI's but
only for a reduced number of states and at an annual basis.
3and the series starts in 1969. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports employment in each
sector based on the SIC classi¯cation until 2001, and based on the NAICS classi¯cation
after 2001. Because there is no straightforward mapping between the two classi¯cation
systems, we end our sample in 2001. Using the detailed information for each sector, we
measure the degree of specialization in each state with the Her¯ndahl indexes of employment.
We construct the Her¯ndahl indexes by adding up the sum of squared employment shares.
The list of the sectors can be found in Table 1. The theories suggest that at the earlier
stages of development economies diversify, but as they become more developed, they start
to specialize in more productive sectors. Accordingly, we would expect diversi¯cation to
contribute to the reductions in volatility.4 We further use employment shares of various
major sectors to capture the labor force composition of each state and include them as
additional controls. The labor force composition allows us to control for the importance
of endowment sectors (agriculture and mining) relative to more advanced sectors such as
manufacturing and services.
Another set of controls includes measures of bank integration constructed by Morgan
et al. (2004). They show that °uctuation in a state's economic growth falls as banks get
more integrated. We include the same bank integration measures in order to check whether
the relationship between development and volatility holds when we also control for bank
integration. The four bank integration measures we use are: dummy variables for the dereg-
ulation of interstate banking and interstate branching, and two continuous measures for
capturing the degree of integration. The ¯rst one, is the interstate asset ratio, which equals
the fraction of bank assets in a given state that are owned by a holding company that owns
assets in other states. The second measure is the other state asset ratio, which is the ratio of
total out-of-state assets held by holding companies in state i to total assets in state i. The
interstate asset and other state asset ratios are available only for the 1976-1994 subsample.
Detailed information about these variables can be found in Morgan et al. (2004).
3. Results
Table 2 presents the Instrumental Variables estimates of equation (1) for the 48 contiguous
states. In the ¯rst two columns volatility is measured as the absolute value of deviations
from the mean growth rate of each state, and in the last two columns it is measured as
the residual from the AR(1) speci¯cation for the growth rate of personal income. The
estimates obtained using the two di®erent volatility measures are quantitatively very similar.
In all of the speci¯cations we treat income and specialization as endogenous variables. As
instruments, we use appropriate lags of the regressors and two lags of population growth rate
of each state. The exact list of instruments can be found at the end of each table. All four
speci¯cations in Table 2 are supported by the tests of over-identifying restrictions, for which
the Sargan-Hansen test statistics fail to reject the validity of the instrument sets, and by the
4The Her¯ndahl measure lies between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to full-specialization. Diversi¯cation
implies a reduction in the Her¯ndahl measure; therefore the expected sign for the Her¯ndahl in our regression
is positive.
4Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests of under-identi¯cation, for which the null hypotheses of
under-identi¯cation are strongly rejected.
We start by discussing the results for the baseline speci¯cation, which includes income and
income-squared only, and then proceed by including Her¯ndahl index, to capture the impact
of diversi¯cation. In all four of the speci¯cations the income terms are highly signi¯cant. The
results in Table 2 show that there is a statistically signi¯cant non-monotonic relationship
between the level of income and volatility in the US. While volatility initially decreases with
income (mathematically, the linear term dominates the quadratic one), it then increases
at later stages of development. Intuitively, this result suggests that the initially poorer
states experienced a decline in volatility as their income levels increased and as they got
economically more developed. Furthermore, the relatively wealthier states did not bene¯t
from the Great Moderation as they were already in an advanced stage of development. This
is consistent with the aforementioned theoretical studies that predict that at early stages
of development, economies will diversify production and obtain reductions in volatility. At
later stages of development, however, they can invest in high risk-high return projects, which
would allow them to achieve higher productivity at the cost of increased volatility.
Next, we include the Her¯ndahl index in our baseline speci¯cation in order to evaluate
the impact of diversi¯cation on the volatilities. The Her¯ndahl index is positive and highly
signi¯cant in both of the speci¯cations. This suggests that the diversi¯cation of production
along the states' development processes, measured by a decrease in the Her¯ndahl index, has
also contributed to the reduction in their volatilities. The estimates in columns (2) and (4)
imply that, on average, a 1% increase in diversi¯cation (a 1% reduction in the Her¯ndahl),
would decrease income volatility by 2.79% and 3.51%, respectively.5
To analyze the impact of specialization further, we report the change in the Her¯ndahl
index from the beginning of the sample to the end, along with per capita real income in 1969,
the initial year for the Her¯ndahl series, for the 48 states in Table 3. As can be seen in Table 3,
while most of the states diversi¯ed their production bases (decrease in the Her¯ndahl index),
there are 14 states, where the degree of specialization increased. The state that experienced
the largest degree of diversi¯cation is North Dakota. The 30.11% increase in diversi¯cation
in North Dakota combined with the estimate of the Her¯ndahl index in Table 2, implies that
the volatility of income growth in North Dakota moderated approximately by 84% (using
the ¯rst measure of volatility). On the other end of the spectrum, the wealthier states, such
as Connecticut and New York, have experienced more specialization (approximately 11%
each), which contributed to higher income growth volatility in those states (approximately
by 28%, using the ¯rst measure).
In order to check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional variables
that have been previously looked at in the literature, we include employment shares of ¯ve
major sectors, and the bank integration measures.6 Since the two volatility measures give
5The elasticities of the volatility measures with respect to the Her¯ndahl index are calculated at the
sample means. The means for the two volatility measures are 0.0187 (deviations from the mean measure)
and 0.0182 (AR(1) residuals measure). The sample mean for the Her¯ndahl index is 0.0880.
6Another interesting variable that has been looked at in the literature is age composition of the labor
force. Jaimovich and Siu (2009) document the link between age composition of the labor force and the
5us very similar results, we present results using the volatility measure constructed with the
deviations from the mean. Similar to the previous speci¯cations, we treat the additional
control variables as endogenous and instrument them. The ¯rst column of Table 4 presents
the results with the employment shares of agriculture, mining, durable and non-durable
manufacturing and services sectors. In their decomposition, Koren and Tenreyro (2007)
¯nd that agriculture and mining are more volatile than manufacturing, which is in turn
more volatile than services. Based on their ¯nding, we would expect states with larger
agriculture and mining sectors to be more volatile and states with larger services sector
to be less volatile. We ¯nd a signi¯cant impact of the services sector only, while income
variables and the Her¯ndahl index are still signi¯cant. Since the Her¯ndahl index measures
the extent of diversi¯cation by capturing the concentration of employment shares in the
various sectors, employment shares might not be providing additional information in this
setup. When we exclude the Her¯ndahl index from this speci¯cation, the shares of durable
manufacturing and services become negative and signi¯cant. The negative and signi¯cant
impact of durable-goods share is also found in Owyang et al. (2008), who interpret the
result as an evidence for volatility reductions due to innovations in durable-goods' inventory
management. As expected, a higher share of employment in services is associated with a
lower income volatility. Additionally, the estimates imply that a higher share of agriculture
in total employment is associated with higher volatility, although the share of agriculture is
only marginally signi¯cant (the corresponding p-value is 0.106).
Finally, we investigate the impact of banking deregulation on income volatility. Columns
(2) and (3) of Table 4, display the results with interstate-banking and interstate-branching
deregulation indicators, respectively, and column four displays the results with the interstate
and other state asset ratios. Out of these four measures, only the interstate asset ratio is
estimated signi¯cantly, and the other main variables of interest remain signi¯cant. As in
Morgan et al. (2004), the negative coe±cients imply that increased bank capital mobility
is associated with lower income volatility.7 In all these new speci¯cations, our measures of
development and specialization remain statistically signi¯cant, which further con¯rms our
conjecture that they are essential factors in understanding the substantial heterogeneity in
the degree of moderation across the states.
4. Conclusion
State level data can be a fruitful source of information about economic volatility and its
determinants. Our empirical results demonstrate a consistent relationship between volatility
and economic development. We ¯nd a robust relationship between a state's volatility and its
income per capita and degree of specialization. From low levels of income, growth decreases
business cycle volatility in G7 economies. Speci¯cally, they ¯nd that the share of 15-29 year olds plus 60-64
year olds (the "volatile-age" groups) in total labor force is positively associated with increased business cycle
volatility. Even though it would be very interesting to replicate their study for the US states, the lack of
data on detailed age groups for the 1970-2001 sample prohibits us from investigating this channel.
7Morgan et al. (2004) use a slightly di®erent volatility measure and ¯nd negative and signi¯cant impacts
of both the inter-state and other-state assets ratios on volatility for 50 states.
6volatility, but at higher income levels growth increases volatility. Moreover, increases in
specialization contribute to increases in volatility. We also ¯nd that expansion of interstate
banking and the size of the service sector are among the factors that have reduced volatility.
Finally, there is some evidence that the decline in the share of durable manufacturing con-
tributed to lower volatility. Our results complement the literature on state-level moderation,
showing that the heterogeneity in moderation across the states can be related to the stage
of development and diversi¯cation/specialization in the states.
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9Table 1: Sectors (SIC Classi¯cation)
Agriculture, forestry and ¯shing Paper products, printing and publishing
Mining Transportation
Construction Utilities
Wood, lumber and furniture manufacturing Communication
Leather products manufacturing Wholesale trade
Stone, clay and glass manufacturing Retail trade
Primary and fabricated metals manufacturing Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Industrial and electronic machinery and equipment Hotel, lodging and entertainment services
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment Personal services
Instruments and related manufacturing Business services
Miscellaneous manufacturing Auto and miscellaneous repair services
Food and kindred products manufacturing Health Services
Tobacco products manufacturing Legal services
Textile mill products and apparel manufacturing Educational services
Chemicals manufacturing Other services
Petroleum products manufacturing Government
Rubber and plastic manufacturing
Notes: The Her¯ndahl index is constructed as the sum of squared employment shares of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11Table 3: Diversi¯cation for the States
State Her¯ndahl 1969 Her¯ndahl 2001 Change in Her¯ndahl Income 1969
Alabama 0.0905 0.0823 -0.0081 10437.02
Arizona 0.0795 0.0788 -0.0130 13302.49
Arkansas 0.1003 0.0873 -0.0007 9955.372
California 0.0894 0.0774 -0.0120 17328.87
Colorado 0.1076 0.0840 -0.0236 14073.70
Connecticut 0.0698 0.0775 0.0077 18494.88
Delaware 0.0973 0.0897 -0.0076 16875.43
Florida 0.0934 0.0878 -0.0057 13980.15
Georgia 0.0936 0.0806 -0.0130 12036.80
Idaho 0.0895 0.0823 -0.0143 12392.51
Illinois 0.1020 0.0877 0.0024 16612.80
Indiana 0.0741 0.0766 0.0001 14102.46
Iowa 0.0762 0.0763 -0.0072 13989.99
Kansas 0.1018 0.0846 -0.0172 13581.49
Kentucky 0.0880 0.0830 -0.0050 11298.47
Louisiana 0.0936 0.0882 -0.0054 11051.67
Maine 0.0737 0.0773 -0.0039 11979.02
Maryland 0.1089 0.0928 -0.0161 16053.96
Massachusetts 0.0888 0.0849 0.0036 16072.64
Michigan 0.0790 0.0780 -0.0010 15914.23
Minnesota 0.0829 0.0786 -0.0044 14414.07
Mississippi 0.0782 0.0800 -0.0112 9139.944
Missouri 0.0984 0.0872 0.0018 13647.97
Montana 0.1110 0.0976 -0.0134 12545.57
Nebraska 0.0936 0.0799 -0.0171 13657.42
Nevada 0.1419 0.0992 -0.0203 17252.17
New Hampshire 0.1024 0.0853 0.0021 14292.81
New Jersey 0.0796 0.0817 0.0076 17263.37
New Mexico 0.0710 0.0786 -0.0271 11134.58
New York 0.1315 0.1044 0.0078 17555.40
North Carolina 0.1285 0.1082 -0.0137 11614.49
North Dakota 0.0728 0.0806 -0.0427 11767.74
Ohio 0.0722 0.0786 0.0063 14998.46
Oklahoma 0.1051 0.0874 -0.0177 12241.72
Oregon 0.0862 0.0806 -0.0056 14017.52
Pennsylvania 0.0685 0.0760 0.0075 14576.09
Rhode Island 0.0878 0.0813 -0.0065 14742.96
South Carolina 0.1097 0.0863 -0.0234 10761.75
South Dakota 0.1297 0.0916 -0.0381 11512.33
Tennessee 0.0745 0.0771 0.0026 11278.48
Texas 0.0868 0.0815 -0.0053 12859.38
Utah 0.1171 0.0849 -0.0322 11834.24
Vermont 0.1231 0.0921 0.0043 12894.63
Virginia 0.0771 0.0814 -0.0309 13596.33
Washington 0.1027 0.0868 -0.0159 15617.23
West Virginia 0.0829 0.0770 0.0130 10667.09
Wisconsin 0.0777 0.0907 -0.0059 14331.03
Wyoming 0.1203 0.1029 -0.0174 13645.90
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